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T
he financial crisis of the past two years is unprecedented in the 
postwar United States. In magnitude and breadth, the crisis has 
resembled the Great Depression. Policymakers have responded 
by drawing on standard fiscal and monetary policy tools but also, as the 
crisis worsened, on a range of exceptional policy actions.
Some of the events have made clear the importance of expectations 
in an economy. The economic choices individuals make are often based 
on their expectations of what other people will do—in what economists 
call a “coordination game.”  In such situations, changes in the beliefs of 
what others may do can affect the actions of individuals. A key element 
in such situations is that, as the collective beliefs change and individuals 
respond to these altered expectations, the outcome in the marketplace 
can change. In the recent crisis, the coordination of expectations played 
a key role in areas such as financial markets, the housing market, and 
the automobile sector. 
When the coordination of expectations results in a crisis or a panic, 
policymakers are the primary group with the ability to alter the ex-
pectations of individuals. By using various policy tools, policymakers 
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can lessen the damage from the crisis. Such tools include providing 
guarantees and changing marketplace incentives, such as interest rates 
and tax rates.
This article develops a framework to illustrate how the coordination 
of expectations was instrumental in the recent economic and financial 
crisis. The framework also helps describe the actions policymakers took 
to limit the severity of the downturn by coordinating expectations to 
achieve more positive outcomes. The first section explains the essen-
tial elements of the coordination-game framework. The second section 
discusses several aspects of the U.S. economy that became important 
events in the crisis due to changing expectations. The third section de-
scribes policy actions that can effectively reshape expectations and re-
store confidence in the economy. The fourth section discusses actions 
taken by policymakers in response to the events in the current crisis.
I.  A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Coordination games highlight the role of expectations in the choices 
of economic agents, such as households and firms. In this game, the 
choices of agents are complementary, meaning that agents have an incen-
tive to do what others are doing. These complementarities often gener-
ate multiple outcomes of the interaction between agents. Some of these 
outcomes are better than others, but no single individual, acting alone, 
can coordinate the choices of all individuals to achieve the best outcome. 
This section describes the general framework of a coordination 
game. The framework then provides a basis for understanding a classic 
example of coordination games in financial markets: a bank run. 
Coordination games
A coordination game is a strategic situation in which an individu-
al’s payoff to taking an action depends on the choices of others (Cooper 
and John; Cooper).1 Such situations are widespread in an economy:   
firms interacting with other firms, households interacting with one an-
other, and firms and even governments interacting with each other and 
with individuals. 
A simple example can illustrate a coordination game: the choice of 
which side of the road to drive on. In the absence of government rules, 
how would a driver decide whether to drive on the right or left side of ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2010  7
the road? The driver would likely make that decision based on his or 
her belief of what other drivers are most likely to do, thus minimizing 
the risk of an accident.
As in this example, a couple of characteristics distinguish a co-
ordination game from other forms of strategic interaction. First, in-
dividuals in a coordination game want to do what others do. That 
is, in these games the payoff to an action is higher when that action 
conforms to the expected action of others. In the driving example, 
an individual clearly wants to match his or her choice of which side 
to drive on with the expected choices of all other drivers. This fea-
ture will be a common ingredient in the coordination games found 
in the financial crisis.
Second, the coordination game often fails to have a unique pre-
diction about the outcome of the strategic interaction. That is, a co-
ordination game may have multiple outcomes (multiple equilibria). 
Each outcome satisfies the property that everyone is acting in their own 
self-interest, given expectations that are consistent with the choices of 
others. For the driving example, the two possible outcomes are that ev-
eryone drives on the left or everyone drives on the right. Both outcomes 
are feasible and sustainable, as evidenced by comparing driving habits 
in the United States and the United Kingdom.
Moreover, some of these outcomes may be more desirable than oth-
ers from a social perspective. Thus, a coordination game can generate 
bad outcomes for society even if each individual acts in his or her best 
interest. In the driving example, there is not a distinguishable difference 
between everyone driving on the left or right. But for the examples 
from the financial crisis, there is often a clear distinction between good 
and bad outcomes.
 In short, economists focus on outcomes (sometimes called equilib-
ria) of coordination games that satisfy two main conditions:
•	Each	actor	in	the	game	makes	choices	in	his	or	her	best	interest,	
given expectations about the actions of others.
•	The	 expectations	 that	 each	 actor	 has	 about	 the	 actions	 of	  
others are consistent with the choices of others.
Put succinctly, these are conditions of optimization and consistency 
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This article focuses on identifying interactions in the economy that 
have the essential features of coordination games. For these interactions, 
the expectations of the behavior of others can have powerful economic 
impacts. Given that some outcomes of these coordination games may be 
socially undesirable, it is natural to think about corrective policy actions, 
which themselves often work through expectations. 
The classic example: Bank runs
A bank run provides a clear example of a coordination game, much 
like choosing which side of the road to drive on.2 Consider the follow-
ing generalized depiction of how a bank operated and how its depositors 
made choices in the days before deposit insurance, such as at the begin-
ning of the Great Depression.
As one of many individuals with a bank account, suppose you de-
posit $100 in a bank that offers an annual interest rate of 10 percent. 
The bank takes the deposits and invests them in a couple of ways. Some 
of the money is put into long-term investments, like financing the pur-
chase of a house. A long-term investment is typically illiquid, meaning 
that if it needed to be sold on short notice, it would likely be sold at a 
discount. The rest of the money is invested in a more liquid asset, or 
even held as cash in the vault. The portfolio of assets chosen by the bank 
reflects higher returns on illiquid investments tempered by the recogni-
tion that some depositors will have liquidity needs in the short run. In 
normal times, the bank’s portfolio balances these interests.
After the bank has chosen its portfolio, some depositors will go to 
the bank and withdraw funds. This is a normal occurrence reflecting the 
liquidity needs of depositors to have cash on hand to make purchases. 
The other depositors without liquidity needs normally leave their mon-
ey in the bank where it is both safe and can earn interest.
But what if times are not normal? Suppose instead that individuals 
without immediate liquidity needs become concerned about the viabili-
ty of the bank. So, just to be safe, they decide to withdraw their deposits. 
If enough depositors begin to worry and take their funds out, this could 
lead to difficulties for the bank.
In such a scenario, the bank may face a liquidity problem. To earn 
higher returns, it invested some of its assets in illiquid investments, ex-
pecting enough depositors would leave funds in the bank for a long ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2010  9
time. But if too many depositors demand their funds back at once, the 
bank most likely will be unable to meet their demands. Unable to repay 
the full value owed to these depositors, the bank will close. This is called 
a bank run.
There are two outcomes to this simple coordination game, where 
everyone is doing the best they can for themselves, given expectations 
of others. If one expects that all other depositors will leave their money 
in the bank for a year, an individual will choose to do the same and earn 
$10 in interest. With this choice, the individual ends up with $110 
after a year rather than $100 if he or she had chosen to withdraw funds 
from the bank immediately.
On the other hand, if one expects that all depositors are going to 
engage in a bank run, an individual will choose to join in the run. By 
doing so, the individual has a chance of redeeming some of his or her 
deposits before the bank runs out of funds and closes its doors. If the 
individual chooses to leave his or her deposits in the bank while others 
engage in a bank run, then the depositor will be even worse off.
Both outcomes are cases where expectations are consistent with the 
actions taken by others. If the outcome is a bank run, everyone’s payoff 
is lower, in some cases much lower, than in the alternative outcome. 
Still, this is an equilibrium outcome since each individual, acting alone, 
is choosing the best possible action. The possibility of getting stuck in 
a bad outcome is what motivates the label coordination game for these 
types of interactions. 
A key feature of a coordination game is that it is in your interest to 
do what you expect others to do. And, as in this example, expectations 
are critical to the survival of a bank.
During the Great Depression, the prospect of bank runs became 
reality. Between 1929 and 1934, more than 10,000 banks failed. Some 
of those failures were due to bad investments and loans made by the 
banks, leaving the banks with more liabilities than assets. As the num-
bers of failures grew, however, deposit holders across a wide range of 
banks became increasingly concerned about their own funds. In such 
a heightened atmosphere of uncertainty, a bank run could be triggered 
by any type of news or rumor that reached a sufficiently large group of 
deposit holders. 10  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
In the classic movie “It’s a Wonderful Life,” the Bailey Building & 
Loan Association faces a bank run in the midst of the Great Depression 
when a crowd gathers to withdraw their funds. George Bailey (Jimmy 
Stewart) explains to his skittish deposit holders that their funds are not 
in the vault—but instead are invested in their neighbors’ houses. Bailey 
finally convinces the depositors that their money is safe, and so they 
withdraw only a fraction of their deposits rather than fully liquidating 
their accounts. In other words, Bailey calms them down by reshaping 
their expectations, thus averting a bank run. 
As the number of bank runs increased during the Great Depres-
sion, government officials acknowledged the role played by expecta-
tions in the banking and economic crisis. In his inaugural address in 
1933,  President  Franklin  Delano  Roosevelt  urged  Americans  to  be 
calm: “Let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear 
is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes 
needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.”
II.   COORDINATION GAMES IN THE RECENT CRISIS
Expectations of others’ behavior contributed to several aspects of 
the recent crisis: financial markets, the housing market, and the market 
for durable goods. This section focuses on how the underlying interac-
tions between economic agents contributed to the worsening of the 
crisis in these areas. 
Financial markets
While the recent crisis is not a consequence of bank runs in a nar-
row sense, a number of bad outcomes during the crisis resembled bank 
runs. As Paul Krugman noted, one of the biggest surprises of the finan-
cial crisis was not that the housing market collapsed but that the dam-
age spread to so many other sectors of financial industry:
We fell into the mistake of thinking that a bank is a big marble build-
ing with a row of tellers; that a bank has to look like a traditional bank; 
or that a bank has to be a depository institution. ...We thought that a bank 
had to look like something that Jimmy Stewart would run. ...A bank is any 
institution or any arrangement that allows people to have what seems to be 
ready access to their funds while at the same time financing long term and/
or illiquid investments. A bank is anything that borrows short and lends 
long; anything that borrows liquid and lends illiquid. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2010  11
Two segments of financial markets that experienced difficulties due 
in part to the coordination of expectations were the market for asset-
backed commercial paper and the money market fund industry.
The asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market has experienced 
three periods of crisis in the past few years. ABCP is a form of short-
term financing used primarily by mortgage lending institutions and 
auto producers. This form of commercial paper is a promissory note 
collateralized by financial assets, such as home and auto loans. 
The first crisis occurred in August 2007. During this month, the 
ABCP market began showing signs of increased uncertainty among 
market participants. Several issuers of ABCP stated that they would 
be unable to redeem ABCP and would instead make use of an option 
to extend the maturity date. In response, interest rates for the entire 
ABCP market began to rise (Chart 1). In a Wall Street Journal article on 
August 8, 2007, David Sylvester, an executive vice president at Wells 
Capital Management stated, “The widening of risk premiums is more 
about fear than substance” (Saha-Bubna).
Over the next several days, investors continued to exit the ABCP 
market. While there were no visible lines of panicked depositors as in 
a traditional bank run, investors in the ABCP market exhibited similar 
behavior.3 A portion of the exit was due to information about specific 
firms that were likely to have trouble repaying their ABCP. But news of 
financial difficulties faced by a few issuers of ABCP also led to increased 
expectations that other issuers would have difficulties repaying their 
promissory notes. Reports that some investors were fleeing the market 
changed expectations. As a result, a large number of investors withdrew 
their funds from the market because they saw others doing it. Analysis 
of financial data suggests that the behavior of investors was relatively 
indiscriminate across ABCP issuers during this stage of the financial 
crisis (Covitz and others).
A second crisis emerged in November 2007. Financial institutions 
and investors once again became reluctant to purchase new issuance of 
commercial paper as economic and financial uncertainty continued to 
mount. A second spike in the interest rate on AA-rated ABCP occurred 
due to the fall in demand (Chart 1). From August 2007 to December 
2007, more than one-third of all ABCP programs were confronted with 
a run by their investors (Covitz and others).12  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The third crisis occurred in middle of September 2008. Following the 
bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers on September 15, investors rushed 
to move their funds to safer investments, in part due to concerns about 
potential collapses of additional financial institutions. The combination 
of the heightened uncertainty of investors with news that some investors 
were leaving the ABCP market changed investor expectations regarding 
the behavior of other market participants. Within the span of a few weeks, 
the interest rate for AA-rated ABCP jumped 2 percentage points.
The money market fund industry was another financial sector that 
experienced significant difficulties during the peak of the financial cri-
sis in September 2008. One day after the failure of Lehman Brothers, a 
large money market fund, the Reserve Primary Fund, announced that 
its net asset value had fallen below $1 per share. This event is referred 
to as “breaking the buck,” which had not happened to a money market 
fund in more than ten years. Over the next two days, nearly two-thirds 
of investors in the Reserve Primary Fund attempted to withdraw their 
money (Kim and Laise). 
Chart 1
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Growing concerns of potential losses at other money market funds 
led to an industry-wide withdrawal similar to that seen in a bank run. 
Investors  became  concerned  that  other  money  market  funds  might 
“break the buck,” but there was little information available to indicate 
which money market funds were safe and which faced losses. As news 
spread that some investors were withdrawing from prime money market 
funds, expectations changed. 
Once investors believed that a large number of investors were with-
drawing or planning to withdraw funds from prime money market 
funds, many of them decided on the same course of action. In just a few 
weeks, institutional investors withdrew approximately one-third of their 
assets from prime money market funds and increased their investment 
in government money market funds (Chart 2). This rapid withdrawal 
of funds threatened to create additional losses and fund closures in the 
industry since prime money market funds had a significant share of as-
sets that could not be quickly liquidated without a sizable loss.
Housing prices
The plight of the housing market has been a key factor in the current 
crisis. One of the most notable features of the housing crisis has been 
the dramatic change in housing prices over a very short period of time. 
While there were many elements that contributed to the wild swings in 
housing prices, one was the expectation of the behavior of others.
To better understand this, it is useful to examine the main determi-
nants of housing prices. Basic economic theory states that the price of an 
asset is equal to the sum of its expected stream of revenue generated over 
time. In the case of a house, the expected stream of revenue is the rental 
income (less any taxes and expenses) that can be earned from owning 
the property, or the implicit rental value of living in the house. This 
valuation can be simplified into a price that is a function of the current 
rent or service flow of living in the house for a year plus the discounted 
value of the house next year. This is represented in the following equa-
tion, where pt represents the price of a house in year t, sft represents the 
service flow or rent in year t, and pt+1/(1+rt ) represents the value of the 
house next year, discounted by today’s interest rate, rt.
€ 
pt = sft +
pt+1
1+ rt
  (1)14  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
In this formulation, it is assumed that everyone knows next year’s 
price. Alternatively, one can think of this as the anticipated price.
Based on this equation, there are two ways to explain variations in 
the current price of housing. One explanation for a drop in housing 
prices, such as seen in recent years, is that the actual flow of services 
from homeownership has fallen. That is, we could try to explain a drop 
in pt by a fall in sft. This is certainly consistent with the equation, but 
does it make good economic sense? Can the fall in housing prices of 
more than 30 percent over the past three years be explained by a drop 
in housing services? This seems unlikely.
The second term in the equation is the price of the house in the 
future, discounted by the interest rate. Could the collapse in house 
prices be due to changes in interest rates? The answer is probably no. 
With interest rates falling in recent years, housing prices should have 
gone up, not down. 
This leaves us with the possibility that the price of houses fell today 
because the price is anticipated to fall next year. Once again, expecta-
tions are important. Here expectations matter because the value of the 
house (or any other asset for that matter) depends in part on the ex-
Chart 2
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pected price that someone else will pay for it in the future. When one 
expects the price to fall tomorrow, today’s value of the house is reduced.
This  analysis,  however,  seems  circular:  Lower  house  prices  are 
explained by… lower prices. As in a coordination game, a decline in 
house prices caused by a large number of people selling their houses can 
lead to additional price declines if people expect other buyers to offer 
even less in the future.
This analysis suggests there might be many paths for prices con-
sistent with expectations of the future home purchasing decisions of 
others. For example, it may be the case that most people believe buyers 
will pay more for houses in the years to come. That expectation makes 
houses more valuable today in anticipation of a higher resale value in 
the future. As time progresses, as long as the prices paid for houses con-
tinue to increase as expected, then indeed house prices will continue 
to rise. This type of self-fulfilling belief is often called a bubble. And, 
as the name suggests, bubbles sometimes “pop.” With the bursting of 
a bubble, the growth rate of prices may decline unexpectedly, or prices 
may even fall.4
The recent housing crisis also exposes how expectations of foreclo-
sures can influence housing prices in a coordination game. From the 
perspective of an individual, it might be wise to walk away from a house 
when its value falls below the outstanding mortgage on the property, 
especially if one thinks the value of the house will continue to decline 
in the future. In such a case, the bank takes over the property and puts 
it up for sale. This increased supply of houses on the market depresses 
prices (especially in neighborhoods most affected by foreclosures), in-
ducing more households (especially in affected neighborhoods) to walk 
away from their houses, further depressing prices and so forth.
One of the cities hardest hit by the housing crisis was Las Vegas. 
Starting in late 2003, housing prices increased abruptly, rising for about 
two years (Chart 3). This huge price increase was fueled by a coordina-
tion of expectations that other people would pay far more for Las Vegas 
houses in the future. 
By the middle of 2007, however, prices began falling just as rapidly. 
It is hard to imagine that this swing in prices was caused by fluctuations 
in the value to an individual of living in a house. Instead, it is more 
likely that these variations in housing prices were driven by the variable 16  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
in equation (1) associated with expectations of what others would pay 
for houses in the future. Before the “bubble” burst in 2007, expected 
future increases in housing prices contributed to a sharp increase in the 
value of homes. When expected prices in the future began to fall, the 
value of homes plunged.
Automobile warranties
As several automobile manufacturers faced the prospect of bank-
ruptcy in 2009, consumer expectations played an important role in de-
termining the viability of these firms.5 Here is a simple story to illustrate 
how consumer expectations can affect consumer choices in this industry.
Suppose that you are interested in buying a durable good, such as 
a car or a computer. Being a durable good, the object is expected to 
last for a few years. But, of course, there is no guarantee that the car or 
computer will operate properly in a few years or even when you buy 
the product in the first place. The firm selling the product appreciates 
the fact that, all else the same, you would prefer not to bear this risk 
of product performance. As a result, many producers of durable goods 
provide warranties. 
Chart 3
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If you believe the producer will make good on its promise under 
the warranty, then you are presumably more likely to buy the product. 
But before you do, it is useful to consider whether the firm will have 
an incentive in the future to abide by the terms of the warranty. What, 
for example, prevents the firm from going out of business, leaving you 
with a worthless warranty?
The answer lies in profits and incentives. The firm has an incentive 
to continue in business in the future as long as doing so is profitable. 
Those profits, in turn, will not come from fulfilling warranty obliga-
tions. Rather, they will come from sales of new goods to new and re-
turning customers.
So, your warranty has value to you today insofar as you believe the 
firm will be in business in the future. And, the firm will be in business 
in the future as long as future customers believe in the value of the 
firm’s warranty. 
Now, you can see why this is like a coordination game. As a con-
sumer today, you are more likely to buy a durable good if you think that 
other consumers will also be buying products in the future. In other 
words, you have an incentive to conform to what others are doing. 
Based on the structure of this coordination game, there are several 
possible outcomes. If everyone is currently optimistic about the future 
of a company, and if everyone expects others to be optimistic as well in 
the future, then the firm’s warranty is more likely to have value. Thus, 
people will buy the product and, facing demand for their product both 
now and in the future, the firm has an incentive to stay in business. 
Sales will be high, profits will be high, and consumers will be satisfied 
that their warranties have value.
Another possible outcome is based on everyone being pessimistic. 
In this case, people are doubtful that the firm will remain in business 
in the future. Thus, they do not value the warranty and do not buy the 
product—which leads to bankruptcy for the firm.
In both cases, expectations were consistent with the market out-
come. This consistency implies that in markets where products come 
with warranties, expectations matter.
In the recent recession, sales of U.S. automobiles dropped sharply, 
and news reports suggested that some of the auto manufacturers might 
be facing bankruptcy. The news of a potential automaker’s failure can 18  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
slash sales if consumers become pessimistic about the future of the auto 
firm and their warranty. In that case, car sales of the company may fall, 
not just because of the recession, but also because of the effects of the 
recession on expectations. 
This expectation effect then magnifies the direct effects of the re-
cession. As the number of consumers who share this belief grows, so 
will the negative effects on the car-purchasing decisions of other con-
sumers. And, as car sales decline due to the changing expectations, the 
likelihood of bankruptcy for the firm only increases. This coordination 
of expectations may ultimately result in a situation where virtually no 
consumers purchase a car from a manufacturer because they observe 
that no one else is purchasing from that company. In short, if these ex-
pectations are strong enough, the firm could be driven out of business.
III.  POLICY INTERVENTION IN COORDINATION GAMES
As already seen, a coordination of expectations can lead to severe 
outcomes. The problem in each of these situations is that no individual, 
acting alone, can resolve the coordination problem. Through common 
action, however, it may be possible to coordinate a better outcome. But 
doing so is difficult in an economy consisting of many individuals acting 
alone. This explains why there may be a role for monetary or fiscal policy.
Policy intervention can influence the outcome of a coordination 
game in two main ways. Policymakers can choose to change incen-
tives or provide guarantees. (Box 1 describes a third option for policy 
intervention.) This section describes these options, and the following 
section examines how these tools were used in the recent crisis.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that this discussion ex-
plores actions that can be taken by policymakers in the midst of a cri-
sis. Once expectations have coordinated toward a negative outcome, 
a crisis has likely emerged and normal policy tools are not likely to be 
effective. The policy actions discussed below are not likely to be the 
best long-term policies, so they should be implemented with care and, 
in some cases, only for short periods of time until a crisis has been re-
solved and expectations have shifted toward a more positive outcome. 
If left in place for longer periods of time, many of these extraordinary 
policy actions would likely affect the decisions of individuals and firms 
in a way that could lead to more frequent periods of crisis in the future. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2010  19
Box 1
PROVIDING INFORMATION
Policymakers can also act to avoid coordination problems by 
providing information or requiring that information be provided 
to individuals.11 In previous examples, it was effectively assumed 
that everyone knows what all other individuals are doing. But in 
reality, individuals are not sure what others are doing. This may be 
because individuals are receiving different signals about the state 
of the economy or different signals about what others are likely to 
do. Therefore, individuals may base their choices of action on the 
information they have received about others’ most likely action.
To see how this might work, suppose an individual is inclined 
to choose one action, which would lead to a positive economic 
outcome. But if the individual receives false information indicat-
ing that other individuals are choosing a different action, he or she 
may choose a less-positive action if there is an incentive to follow 
the actions of others. If a sufficient number of people receive and 
act on this false information, expectations are confirmed, but the 
outcome is not good.
In some cases, policymakers may be in the position to provide 
valuable information. Suppose that policymakers let it be known 
to everyone that many individuals are indeed inclined to choose 
the action with a positive outcome. If they can accumulate this 
information and provide it to all individuals, this may offset the 
private false information individuals receive about others and will 
enhance incentives to choose the positive action. In the recent 
crisis, the provision of information was not one of the main tools 
used by policymakers. However, this may be a valuable tool for 
policymakers to use in future situations.20  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Changing incentives 
One way to deal with coordination problems is to change incen-
tives. Policymakers have a variety of tools that can be used to induce   
individual households and firms to change their behavior. These in-
clude fiscal policy variables, such as taxes and spending, as well as mon-
etary policy tools, which ultimately influence interest rates. 
The coordination of driving behavior can be used as a simple il-
lustration. If individuals in a community (without existing rules and 
regulations) are having difficulties determining which side of the road 
to drive on, the government could institute a fine for anyone seen driv-
ing on the left side of the road. With the introduction of this penalty, an 
individual’s choice becomes simple. The individual will prefer to drive 
on the right side of the road to avoid the penalty and will assume that 
others will do likewise. Since this is true for all individuals in the econ-
omy, the outcome is that everyone drives on the right side of the road. 
As a second example, suppose individuals have become extremely 
pessimistic about the economy and decide to stop providing capital for 
investment. In that case, the government could enact a tax policy to 
give a credit to any individuals or firms that choose to invest—an in-
vestment tax credit. If the tax credit is large enough, a sufficient number 
of individuals will choose to invest, expectations will adjust, confidence 
in the economy will improve, and economic activity will increase.
These examples of policy actions seem like simple solutions to the 
coordination game. The government can simply pay or penalize indi-
viduals or firms to induce them to take the appropriate actions. How-
ever, this analysis is incomplete since it fails to take into account how 
the government pays for a subsidy or how it uses the penalties it collects. 
In some cases, a subsidy for one group is paid for via a tax penalty on 
another group. It turns out that the combination of subsidies and taxes 
used by the government matters for the coordination game.
In the example of the investment tax credit, the decision of how to 
raise revenue to pay for the tax credit can affect the decisions of firms. 
The creation of a new tax might undo the intended effect of the sub-
sidy. For example, if the government increases the corporate tax rate 
to pay for the investment tax credit, then a firm no longer has much 
of an incentive to invest. The savings from the investment tax credit 
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new investment. On the other hand, if the investment tax credit is fi-
nanced by issuing more debt now and raising labor taxes to pay off the 
debt sometime in the future, the incentive effects of the investment tax 
credit today will be larger for the firm. Other decisions, however, will 
likely be influenced in the future when labor taxes are raised.
Guarantees
Regardless of how the subsidy is paid for, the fact remains that a subsi-
dy is costly to society. A second form of policy intervention works directly 
on modifying expectations. In some cases, this policy enables the govern-
ment to support a specific outcome without paying out any subsidies.
The policy can be best illustrated using the example of bank runs. 
Suppose a bank with a healthy portfolio of assets is suddenly faced with 
a bank run, based on unfounded fears by its depositors. Without any 
assistance, the bank would be forced to liquidate its assets and may be 
unable to meet all of the withdrawal demands of depositors.
The government could avert this outcome by providing a guaran-
tee on all deposits. With this guarantee, individuals no longer have any 
reason to participate in a bank run since there is no benefit in being the 
first to withdraw. Depositors will leave their funds in their accounts, 
and the bank run will be averted.
This is a very powerful policy that in the end has zero cost to the 
government when a bank is healthy. Since the government guarantee in 
this simple example only applies when an individual maintains a deposit 
while others participate in a run on the bank, the government will never 
have to make payments to individuals. With this policy in place, there is 
only one outcome for this coordination game—bank runs are eliminated. 
In the United States, this guarantee takes the form of deposit insur-
ance. The introduction of deposit insurance following the Great De-
pression has virtually eliminated all bank runs. The overall cost to the 
government is not zero, however, because banks can fail in situations 
where they have made bad investments with depositors’ funds. In such 
situations, the government will have to pay for any losses of depositors’ 
funds. These losses are covered by premiums that banks pay for deposit 
insurance or by general government funds if the losses exceed collected 
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ance protects society and healthy banks from bank runs that otherwise 
could occur in times of crisis.
The government must also remain keenly aware of the adverse in-
centives created by issuing guarantees. Suppose that the government 
issued a guarantee on the warranties of an automobile producer. One 
concern is that a company might now have an incentive to produce 
low-quality vehicles and sell them at a high price to consumers who 
are protected by the government guarantee program. Since they are 
insured by either the firm or the government, consumers are not as 
vigilant in monitoring quality. The firm could produce low-quality cars 
and then leave the market with high current profits, leaving the govern-
ment a large obligation to households who have purchased low-quality 
vehicles that will soon begin malfunctioning. 
IV.   POLICY INTERVENTION IN THE CURRENT CRISIS
Over the past few years, policymakers have used these tools to 
help lessen the effects of certain aspects of the recent economic crisis. 
The events discussed in Section II are prime examples. In each event, 
policymakers intervened in the marketplace in an attempt to influence 
individual actions and coordinate expectations, thus averting further 
damage to the economy and financial markets. This section returns to 
each of those events and describes the policy actions taken within the 
context of a coordination game.
Financial markets
As discussed earlier, the crises faced by many segments of financial 
markets bore close similarities to classic bank runs. (Box 2) But the mar-
kets now facing “bank runs” comprise more complex structures than 
banks from the 1930s. The actions of policymakers in the recent crisis 
were traditional at first but became increasingly nontraditional as the 
crisis worsened. As in Section II, this discussion focuses on two seg-
ments of financial markets: the ABCP market and the money market 
fund industry.
In the asset-backed commercial paper market, investors responded 
to the actions of monetary policymakers. The first crisis in the market 
(August 2007) coincided with broader uncertainty in many lending 
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Box 2
DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND A RECENT BANK RUN
One of the actions taken in response to the banking instabil-
ity in the Great Depression was the provision of deposit insurance 
through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The 
provision of deposit insurance is a government guarantee for de-
posit holders.12 
In this case, the government guarantee can eliminate all bank 
runs since depositors no longer have to worry about the safety of 
funds. This is essentially what has happened in the United States 
following the creation of the FDIC in the Banking Act of 1933. 
The act specified the type of financial institutions that could be 
insured and the amount of insurance for a depositor’s account. As 
a result of the government provision of deposit insurance, there 
have been extremely few banks runs since the Great Depression.13
While the provision of deposit insurance has virtually eliminat-
ed bank runs in the United States, bank-run coordination failures 
continue to occur in other countries. In the UK, Northern Rock ex-
perienced an old-style bank run in September 2007. The run started 
following an announcement by the Bank of England stating that 
it had given emergency funding to Northern Rock. The Bank of 
England reported that this funding was a temporary measure to help 
Northern Rock during a period of “turbulence in financial markets.” 
To reassure financial markets, the press release stated:
The [Financial Services Authority] judges that Northern Rock is 
solvent, exceeds its regulatory capital requirement and has a good loan 
book. The decision to provide a liquidity support facility to Northern 
Rock reflects the difficulties that it has had in accessing longer term 
funding and the mortgage securitisation market, on which Northern 
Rock is particularly reliant (Bank of England).
In the days following the announcement, Northern Rock’s de-
positors began lining up to withdraw their funds. Under the Finan-
cial Service Compensation Scheme, the first 2,000 pounds (approxi-
mately $3,100) of deposits were fully insured and the next 33,000 
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the event of a bank failure. Any deposits in excess of 35,000 pounds 
were uninsured. As demonstrated by the number of customers who 
lined up to withdraw their funds, this guarantee program was not 
sufficient to prevent a bank run. Over the next three days, depositors 
withdrew 8 percent of all deposits (Jordan).
At this point, Alistair Darling, chancellor of the exchequer for 
the UK, intervened by issuing a full guarantee for all deposits. He 
stated: 
I want to put the matter beyond doubt. In the current market 
circumstances, and because of the importance I place on maintaining 
a stable banking system and public confidence in it, I can announce 
today that following discussions with the Governor [of the Bank of 
England] and the Chairman of the [Financial Services Authority], 
should it be necessary, we, with the Bank of England, would put in 
place arrangements that would guarantee all the existing deposits in 
Northern Rock during the current instability in the financial markets. 
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responded quickly to this situation in an attempt to avoid a larger-scale 
panic. Their first action was to issue a press release: 
The Federal Reserve is providing liquidity to facilitate the orderly func-
tioning of financial markets. …In current circumstances, depository insti-
tutions may experience unusual funding needs because of dislocations in 
money and credit markets (August 10). 
A week later, the Federal Reserve Board modified the terms of the 
discount window, which is an instrument of monetary policy that allows 
eligible financial institutions to borrow money directly from a Federal 
Reserve Bank. The rate on discount window loans was lowered 50 basis 
points, and the maturity period for these loans was extended from over-
night to up to 30 days. Both of these measures taken by the Federal Re-
serve were efforts to change incentives in financial markets to promote 
a good outcome.
For the ABCP market, these policy actions were not enough to stem 
the flight of investors. They became increasingly concerned about the 
potential for defaults on commercial paper, and they heard reports of 
investors fleeing this market. This coordination of beliefs regarding the 
actions of other investors magnified the incentive for an investor to exit 
the commercial paper market. If an investor was concerned that firms is-
suing ABCP would be unable to continue to get financing in the market 
when old paper came due, there was a perceived risk that the firm might 
run out of funds and default on existing commercial paper. Therefore, 
expectations of a significant number of investors planning to exit the 
market would likely cause a concerned investor to exit the market as 
soon as possible. By early September, the amount of ABCP placed by 
investment dealers fell by nearly 30 percent, from $1.1 trillion to $0.8 
trillion, a retrenchment of the market to its size back in March 2006. 
Interest rates on 30-day, AA-rated ABCP rose from 5.3 percent to 6.3 
percent as an indication of the additional return that was required for an 
investor to purchase ABCP.
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) responded to the 
broader financial crisis on September 18 by cutting the federal funds 
target rate. In its press release, the FOMC noted rising concern due to 
disruptions in financial markets:
Economic growth was moderate during the first half of the year, but 
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correction and to restrain economic growth more generally. Today’s action is 
intended to help forestall some of the adverse effects on the broader economy 
that might otherwise arise from the disruptions in financial markets and to 
promote moderate growth over time.
The lowering of the federal funds target rate contributed to a tem-
porary calm in ABCP markets, as shown by the decline in the AA-rated 
ABCP interest rate in Chart 1.
Around the time of the second crisis in ABCP markets (November 
2007), the Federal Reserve decided to take additional steps to provide 
liquidity to financial markets. The FOMC had already lowered the fed-
eral funds target rate from 5.25 percent in August 2007 to 4.5 percent in 
November 2007. On November 26, the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York announced it would temporarily conduct a series of repurchase 
agreements to provide short-term funding to financial institutions. This 
program, however, was not sufficient to stem the flight from the com-
mercial paper market. As before, increased expectations of the likeli-
hood of other investors exiting the ABCP market likely contributed to 
an increase in the number of investors who stopped funding ABCP. The 
result was that interest rates on ABCP continued to rise.
Additional action was taken by the Federal Reserve on December 
12, when it announced it would establish a Term Auction Facility. Un-
der this program, the Federal Reserve would auction funds to deposi-
tory institutions for a term of approximately one month. The important 
aspect of this program is that these loans could be secured with a “wide 
variety of collateral,” including commercial paper. The first auction was 
held on December 17. 
This provision of liquidity had an immediate effect on the AA-rated 
ABCP interest rate. In terms of expectations, the provision of lower-
cost loans served to change incentives in the ABCP market. The action 
helped break the coordination of expectations on the outcome where 
investors expected many other investors would likely exit the market. 
Investors now had a greater incentive to remain in the ABCP market. 
For some investors, this additional incentive was strong enough to offset 
or even change their negative expectations regarding the likely actions of 
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in expectations, the AA-rated ABCP interest rate fell nearly two per-
centage points over the next month.
Following the third crisis in the ABCP market (September 2008), 
which was a part of the larger crisis that affected most financial markets, 
the Federal Reserve decided to intervene directly. On October 7, the 
Federal Reserve announced that it would lend directly to nonfinancial 
corporations for the first time since the Great Depression. This new pro-
gram, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, allowed for the purchase 
of unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) of sufficient 
quality. With the Federal Reserve replacing investors as buyers of ABCP, 
the interest rate on AA-rated ABCP dropped sharply to levels closer to 
the typical margin above the federal funds target rate (Chart 1).
This policy action likely had a lesser effect on expectations than 
prior actions. Instead of trying to change incentives so that investors 
were less likely to exit the ABCP market, the action signaled that the 
Federal Reserve would directly replace exiting investors by providing 
its own funds. This action did reduce concerns that the ABCP market 
would collapse. As conditions stabilized, the coordination of expecta-
tions for an investor run from the ABCP market gradually lessened. 
Federal Reserve purchases of ABCP peaked in January 2009 at $350 
billion. Its investment in the market has fallen gradually since then to 
$40 billion in October 2009.
For the money market fund industry, the government responded to 
the run on prime money market funds with the typical policy response 
used to avert bank runs. On September 19, 2008, three days after the 
money market run began, the Treasury Department announced a tem-
porary guarantee program for the industry.6 The role of investors’ ex-
pectations was cited in the press release “This action should enhance 
market confidence and alleviate investors’ concerns about the ability for 
money market funds to absorb a loss.” The program allowed eligible 
money market funds to purchase insurance from the Treasury Depart-
ment at an established rate, similar to deposit insurance for banks. In 
the following weeks, the pace of withdrawals from prime money market 
funds waned (Chart 2). Shortly thereafter, assets began flowing back 
into the funds.
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In response to the nationwide collapse of the housing market, the 
government has taken numerous steps to help stabilize the sector. From 
the perspective of the coordination game, one purpose of the actions 
was to break the coordination of expectations, where most people be-
lieved that others would pay less than current values for houses in the 
future. If these programs could persuade enough consumers to pay 
more for a house than they would have otherwise, others in the hous-
ing market may upwardly revise their expectations of house prices. 
Through a gradual realignment of the expectations of the housing valu-
ations of other consumers, such actions may contribute to a stabiliza-
tion of house prices.
One program has provided a subsidy to first-time homebuyers. The 
initial version was enacted in July 2008 as part of the Housing and Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of 2008. This provision provided a tax credit of up 
to $7,500 for qualifying first-time homebuyers who made a purchase 
between April 9, 2008 and July 1, 2009. This tax credit was an interest-
free loan from the government that would be repaid over a 15-year 
period via an annual income tax surcharge. By lowering the interest rate 
expense for qualifying first-time homebuyers, this served to increase the 
price that they were willing to pay for a home.
As the housing crisis worsened in 2009, the government decided 
to increase the incentive for first-time homebuyers. In the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the government increased the 
credit to $8,000 for homes purchased between January 1, 2009, and 
November 30, 2009. In addition, the credit no longer needed to be re-
paid if the owner maintained this home as his or her primary residence 
for the first three years following the purchase. This revised version pro-
vided a much greater incentive as the government was now giving a full 
subsidy of up to $8,000 for qualifying homebuyers who remained in 
the purchased home for three years. The goal, as before, was to stem the 
decline in house prices by enticing a subset of buyers to pay more than 
they would otherwise for homes.7
In late 2008, the Federal Reserve also took action to stabilize the 
housing market. The Federal Reserve announced on November 25, 
2008, that it would begin to purchase assets of Fannie Mae, Freddie, 
Mac, and Federal Home Loan Banks (agency debt) and mortgage-
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(agency MBS). The stated goal of this action was to “... reduce the cost 
and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which 
in turn should support housing markets and foster improved conditions 
in financial markets more generally.”  This action of the Federal Reserve 
was aimed at stabilizing (or increasing) house prices by lowering the 
interest rate costs. As the housing crisis deepened in 2009, the Federal 
Reserve expanded this program to its current stated goals of purchasing 
up to $175 billion of agency debt and $1.25 trillion of agency MBS.
A third program was aimed at stabilizing housing markets by limit-
ing the number of foreclosures. The Department of the Treasury estab-
lished the Making Home Affordable program in March 2009 with the 
goal of “... making mortgages more affordable and helping to prevent 
the destructive impact of foreclosures on families, communities and the 
national economy.” While a primary goal of the program was to help 
individuals avoid foreclosure, the program also was set up to help stabi-
lize the housing market by limiting the number of foreclosed homes that 
were for sale and also limiting the housing value declines in neighbor-
hoods that contained large numbers of actual and potential foreclosures. 
In the current crisis, one factor that has stood out as a leading coordi-
nator of expectations regarding the price of a house has been the pres-
ence of a foreclosed home in the neighborhood. Several recent studies 
have found that foreclosures affect the values of nearby houses through 
three primary channels: increased neighborhood blight and crime, low-
er appraisal valuations because of discounted sales of nearby foreclosed 
homes, and increased supply of homes for sale (Lee).
The goal of each of these programs was to stabilize the housing mar-
ket. If these programs could increase the prices that some homebuyers 
were willing to pay, the combined effect may be sufficient to break the 
coordination of expectations for a continued decline in housing prices.
Automobile warranties
In the automobile industry, the government decided to address con-
sumer concerns by providing a guarantee.8  With Chrysler and Gen-
eral Motors facing the prospect of bankruptcy, the U.S. Treasury De-
partment announced on March 30, 2009, the creation of a Warrantee 
Commitment Program in which the warranties for all newly purchased 
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ernment. The guarantee would be in effect until the two companies 
resolved their current financial difficulties.9 In providing an explanation 
for the guarantee program, the government said, “...the program will 
support and encourage the continued viability and restructuring of the 
auto industry by mitigating consumer uncertainty that is depressing 
demand for new vehicles.”
The exact effect of these warranty guarantees on consumer expecta-
tions and automobile sales in general is hard to determine. Since the 
government announcement in March, sales of General Motors vehicles 
have gradually risen relative to the other large auto manufacturers. Sales 
of Chrysler vehicles, however, have fallen sharply relative to the rest of 
the industry. In this case, the role of expectations of behavior by others 
is likely just one part of the decision process faced by consumers when 
purchasing a vehicle.
V.   CONCLUSION
This article has brought a particular perspective to the recent eco-
nomic crisis. The framework of a coordination game focuses on the 
interaction between individual choices and expectations. As expecta-
tions change, individuals often alter their choices in a way that becomes 
self-fulfilling. In some instances, this interaction between choices and 
expectations can lead to dramatically different outcomes in a very short 
period of time.
There have been many examples of coordination games in the re-
cent crisis. This article has focused on bank run-style panics in financial 
markets, rapid swings in housing prices, and consumer confidence in 
automakers and their warranties. These are but a few of the types of 
complementarities that have been highlighted in the economics litera-
ture.10 One of the fascinating aspects of these complementarities is that 
once you are aware of the basic coordination game structure, you can 
see these interactions everywhere. 
Since games with complementarities often have multiple self-ful-
filling outcomes, it is natural to consider the role of the policymakers. 
In the face of rapidly changing expectations in the marketplace, policy-
makers are often the only ones that can act to coordinate expectations 
in a way to avoid bad outcomes. This article has highlighted the role of 
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the recent crisis. However, each of these interventions contains the pos-
sibility of creating longer-term problems as the decisions of individuals 
and firms may change in unintended ways once the crisis is over. There-
fore, these extraordinary policy actions should be enacted with extreme 
caution and, in most cases, only enacted for a limited period of time.32  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
APPENDIX: A COORDINATION GAME
This appendix develops a more detailed framework for a coordi-
nation game that highlights the role of expectations in the choices of 
economic agents, such as households and firms. The framework is then 
used to study bank runs and the role of policymakers in changing in-
centives to prevent them.
A framework for analysis 
The basic framework of analysis is a coordination game. An abstract 
example of a coordination game is shown in Table A1.
Usage of the term “game” refers to a strategic situation in which 
the payoff to taking an action depends on the choices of others. The 
entries in Table A1 correspond to the payoffs (think of these in terms of 
money) for every combination of choices made by an individual and by 
everyone else. The individual’s choices are indicated by the two rows: 
high effort and low effort. Likewise, the columns correspond to the 
choices of high and low effort for all others. At this point, the meaning 
of effort is intentionally vague. One of the points of the applications in 
the article was to make these labels more precise.
To understand the table, suppose that an individual chooses high 
effort while everyone else chooses low effort. Then the individual would 
obtain a payoff of 0. If, instead, the individual chooses low effort and 
everyone else chooses low effort as well, then the individual obtains a 
payoff of 20.
It is assumed that everyone in the economy is identical. Of course, 
this is an abstraction since in reality everyone is different in some way. 
But the goal here is to use the model to highlight the essential interac-
tions between people, leaving aside differences that do not modify the 
central point of investigation. Given this assumption, the payoffs in the 
table apply to each of the participants in the game. You can think of 
each of them as having a chance to choose between high and low effort, 
given the choices of all others. Since everyone is the same, we only have 
to study this choice once.
What can we say about the outcome (equilibrium) of this game? 
Each individual acts independently, taking the choices of everyone else 
as given. Economists think that individuals make choices to maximize 
their payoffs. But in this game, payoffs depend on what others do. Or, 
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To see how this works, what will the individual choose to do if he 
or she believes that all others will choose high effort? Since 100 > 80, 
the individual will choose high effort in response to others choosing 
high effort. So, if the individual expects others to put forth high ef-
fort, the best (payoff maximizing) choice of the individual is to choose 
high effort as well. By the same logic, if the individual expects others 
to choose low effort, then the best choice for the individual is also low 
effort (20>0).
Thus, expectations by one individual about others will influence 
the choice of that individual. In other words, expectations matter.
But then, what determines these expectations and thus the choices 
of what an individual chooses to do?  Suppose that an individual ex-
pects everyone else to choose high effort and thus, by the argument 
above, chooses high effort—but, in fact everyone else chooses low ef-
fort. The outcome would be very unsatisfactory to the individual since 
expectations differed from reality. It is natural then for the individual 
to modify expectations so that they are in accord with the choices of 
others. That is, in fact, the answer to the question: Expectations are 
required to be in accord with the choices of others. 
These two ingredients, the choice of an individual of a payoff- 
maximizing action and the requirement that expectations match actual 
choices, are used to make predictions about the outcome of the coor-
dination game. One outcome, which is called the pessimistic outcome, 
has all individuals in the economy choosing low effort. It was shown 
earlier that if an individual expects everyone else to put forth low effort, 
the individual will also choose low effort. And since this is true for ev-
eryone (since all individuals are the same), the expectation of low effort 
is consistent with the choice of low effort by all individuals. In this way, 
expectations of low effort are self-fulfilling.
Table A1
AN ABSTRACT COORDINATION GAME




You choose HIGH effort 100 0
You choose LOW effort 80 2034  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
There is another outcome, which is called the optimistic outcome. 
In this case, all individuals choose high effort. Looking at a single indi-
vidual, if all others choose high effort, the individual will as well.
So, in this game two outcomes satisfy the requirement that: 1) in-
dividuals make choices that maximize their payoff given expectations 
of others, and 2) the expectations about others conform to what others 
actually choose to do. This means that to make a prediction of an actual 
outcome, as opposed to a set of possible outcomes, something must fix 
expectations in this game.
Of the two possible outcomes, the one in which everyone chooses 
high effort is better for everyone than everyone choosing low effort. 
But, if everyone has pessimistic expectations and thinks that all others 
will choose low effort, it is in their self-interest to do so as well. Because 
of the possibility of getting stuck in an outcome that delivers lower pay-
offs for everyone, this is an example of a coordination game. 
There is an essential ingredient in this game: As others choose high-
er effort, an individual has an incentive to do so as well. You can think 
of this as a type of complementarity between the return to effort by one 
individual and the level of effort chosen by others. That is, the gain to 
higher effort is increasing in the effort put forth by others. In our ex-
ample the gain to high effort is 20 (100-80) when others choose high ef-
fort, and this gain is actually a loss of 20 when others choose low effort.
The bank runs game
The example of a bank run can be formalized using the framework 
of a coordination game. Table A2 displays the choices and payoffs for 
individuals in an environment in which there is no deposit insurance. 
The two rows correspond to the choices of “don’t withdraw” and “with-
draw.” At the same time, all of the other depositors at the bank are 
making the same choices, as depicted in the two columns.15  As in the 
previous example, it is important to note that an individual’s payoff is 
affected by the choices of others.
The game has explicit payoffs that are consistent with the story 
described in Section I. In this case, think of yourself as a depositor who 
puts $100 in the bank. You do not have liquidity needs, and the bank 
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If you choose “don’t withdraw” and the other depositors choose 
“don’t withdraw,” then you will have $110 in the bank next year. If oth-
ers “don’t withdraw” but you do, then you can take your $100 out of 
the bank but you forgo the interest. So, clearly if you expect everyone 
else to choose “don’t withdraw,” then your best choice is “don’t with-
draw” as well since $110 is greater than $100.
But what if you expect others to choose “withdraw”? In that case, if 
you leave your money in the bank, then you will earn $0 since the bank 
will dissolve during the run. If you follow others and try to take your 
money out, then you will only receive a fraction of your initial deposit 
because the bank will be forced to quickly liquidate its long-term assets, 
likely at a loss. If the bank can only redeem 30 percent of deposits, then 
you would get back $30. In this situation, if you expect that the others 
will choose to “withdraw,” then you should do so as well.
In this game, the gains to leaving money in the bank depend on 
what others do. The gain to leaving the money in the bank (that is, 
choosing “don’t withdraw”) is $10 if everyone else chooses “don’t with-
draw.”  But this gain is -$30 (therefore a loss) if you choose “don’t with-
draw” when everyone else is running. 
There are two outcomes where everyone is doing the best they can 
for themselves, given expectations of others. One such outcome is that 
everyone leaves their money in the bank. In this case, everyone has $110 
and the bank does not have to liquidate any of its long-term investments. 
The other outcome is the case when there is a bank run and every-
one attempts to take their money out. Both of these outcomes are cases 
where expectations are consistent with the actions taken by others. If 
the outcome is a bank run, everyone’s payoff is much lower than in the 
alternative outcome. Still, this is an equilibrium outcome since each 
individual, acting alone, is doing the best they can for themselves. The 
possibility of getting stuck in a bad outcome is what motivates the label 
coordination game for these types of interactions.
Table A2
COORDINATION GAME: A BANK RUN
Others / You Others don’t withdraw Others withdraw
You don’t withdraw 110 0
You withdraw 100 3036  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
A key feature of coordination games is that it is in your interest to 
do what you expect others to do. As a result, expectations are critical to 
the survival of a bank.
The coordination game with guarantees added
Is there any way to avoid the pessimistic outcome from Table A1? 
As a reminder, this outcome is possible because the best action for an 
individual is low effort when others are expected to choose low effort. 
However, suppose that the government offers a guarantee that anyone 
choosing high effort would get a payoff of at least 30. Then it would 
look like Table A3.
This game is just like the original table except that an individual gets 
30 by choosing high effort even when everyone else chooses low effort. 
The game now contains a very powerful policy, which in the end has 
zero cost to the government, in this simple environment. Based on the 
payoffs in Table A3, each individual will choose high effort regardless of 
what everyone else does. So the unique outcome will be for everyone to 
choose high effort. The use of guarantees here highlights the role that 
can be played by policymakers in the midst of a coordination failure, 
but they also must be aware that their policies may change incentives 
in a way that can have adverse effects on the actions of individuals and 
businesses in the longer term.
Table A3
A  COORDINATION  GAME  WITH  A  GOVERNMENT 
GUARANTEE




You choose HIGH effort 100 30
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ENDNOTES
1The appendix provides a formal presentation of this game.
2This presentation draws on Diamond and Dybvig and the many extensions 
of their analysis that followed. The appendix provides a formal presentation of this 
game.
3See Covitz and others for an empirical analysis of the ABCP market that finds 
evidence of extensive runs.
4Bubbles are a relatively open and exciting area of research in economics. A 
key challenge is seeing if they are consistent with rational agents (Tirole).
5This discussion draws on Bigelow and others.
6This temporary program was initially scheduled to end on April 30, 2009. 
The end date was later extended to September 18, 2009.
7In terms of the housing price formulation shown in equation (1), the tax 
credit implicitly lowered the interest rate expense for a first-time homebuyer be-
cause the financing of the purchase included a $8,000 tax credit that does not have 
to be repaid.
8Similar arguments, presented in Cooper and Ross, pertain to government-
provided pension benefit insurance.
9Ron Bloom, senior adviser at the U.S. Treasury Department, announced the 
end of the Warranty Commitment Program on July 21, 2009.
10The book Macroeconomic Complementarities by Cooper is organized around 
economic examples of complementarities and provides an extensive set of refer-
ences to the earlier literature on these interactions.
11This discussion is purely suggestive. There is a growing literature on the role 
of government provision of information in strategic settings. See, for example, 
Angeletos and Pavan; and Morris and Shin; and the references therein.
12The appendix contains a formal discussion of the effects of guarantee funds, 
such as deposit insurance, in coordination games.
13However, this insurance has come with a cost. When depositors are fully 
insured, they have no incentive to monitor the investment activities of their bank. 
Part of the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s can be attributed to the lack of in-
centives depositors had for monitoring bank activity (Shoven and others).
14See Shin for a more in-depth analysis of Northern Rock.
15For simplicity, we are just showing what happens if all the others choose 
“don’t withdraw” or “withdraw.”38  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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